WORKER PARTICIPATION M~D FIRM PERFORMANCE:
EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY AND BRI1 叮 l'、 'AIN d
CAPS and CPPS Working Papers are circulated to invite discussion and critical comment. Opinions expressed in them are the author's and should not be taken as representing the opinions of the Centres or Lingnan College. These papers may be freely circulated but they are not to be quoted without the written permission of the author Please address comments and suggestions to the author or the series editors 1. Introduction This paper investigates the impact of the involvement of workers in their companies on various indicators of frrm performance. A comparison is drawn between Germany , with its 甘adition of mandatory works councils, and Britain, long characterized by its voluntaristic system of industrial relations. The theoretical backdrop to 也is ioquiry is the influential model of direct participation offered by Freeman and Lazear (1995) .
Interest in worker participation is at 組 all-time high, and the influence of 出e
German institution is palpable. Practical The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a modified version of the Freeman-Lazear model to fLX ideas as to the relation between worker involvement and the relevant dimensions of fum performance. Section 3 provides institutional detail. The datasets employed, the WIRS and the Hannover Firm Panel, are reviewed in Section 4, toge也er with the equation specifications. Section 5 charts the impact of the participative 1 institutions on measures of frrm productivity , profitability, wages , and employment. An interpretative section concludes.
Theoretical Coojectures
Our starting point is the model of the works council provided by Freeman and Lazear (1995) . Figure 1 is a modification of their basic diagram. The model we present is somewhat more general , relating as it does the intensity of structured "worker involvement," rather than works council power, to the tota1 surplus of 出e enterprise.
Specifically ，出e R(x) 如此tion maps 也is joint surplus against the level of worker inv01vement, x. As shown, al也ough 組 absence of any formal worker involvement is consistent with some positive surplus , the introduction of increasingly structured forms of involvement yields increases in surplus, at least up to some point. Accordingly , R(x) has an inverted-U shape. We add flesh to this barebones concept of 、甘uctured worker involvement," and the forms it takes in Britain and Germany in section 3.
[ Figure 1 near here]
More specifically , Freeman and Lazear 訂gue 血at the joint surplus will increase
Wl由 worker involvement both because management and labor have nonoverlapping relevant information sets and by reason of the creativity of discussion. Thus, for example, the provision of objective infornlation by the flfm increases efficiency by facilitating worker cooperation in tough times when labor might otherwise be disinclined to believe management assertions as to the state of nature. Similarly , the disclosure of private information by the worker side raises the joint surplus. Proceeding one stage further than information disclosure per se , consultation allows new solutions to production and other workplace problems because discussion is creative. Additionally , participation or codetermination is said to provide workers with greater security , thereby encouraging them to take a longer view of the prospects of the firm. These are the advantages. The downside is 出at worker involvement has the disadvantage that it delays decisionmaking. A further disadvantage noted by Freeman and Lazear (1995 , 29) 自由at as worker involvement increases there comes a point where "management does not have enough control over decisions." For both reasons , there is thus some optimum level of worker 2 involvement, x* in the figure. If 也e R(x) function did not have a maximum, then the issue of choosing the degree of worker involvement would not arise.
Decisions about the desired amount of worker involvement are determined not only by 由e R(x) function , but also by distributional considerations. Freeman and Lazear appeal to standard results in barga~g 也eory and argue 出at the worker share in the surplus , s(x) , increases as x increases. 叭1t simply, knowledge is power. As the workers' knowledge increases, so too must their share. Thus, information disclosure by m組agement is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it validates m組ageme帥's claims as to the state of nature but on the other it potentially facilitates rent seeking on the part of workers. Similarly , workers will only divulge their private information to management if they have some say in how 由at information is used (Freeman and Laze缸， 1995, 39) .
Greater worker involvement on these lines means less management discretion.
Accordingly , worker share in the surplus may be expected to rise.
The second bold curve in Figure 1 shows the firm' s pro白的 F(x) ， as a funçtion of worker involvement. Because of the assumption 也at the worker share increases with worker involvement, F(x) peaks before R(x) does. As a result, there will be an underproyjsion of worker involvement, Xf. This result is used by Freeman and Lazear as a justification for a participation mandate; specifically, one that guarantees x.. We are now in a position to summarize the predictions of 由e theory. In union-free envlIonments :
Implicit in Freeman and
(a) the level of worker involvement will be chosen so that the total surplus is close to the optimum, x.;
(b) an increase in worker involvement will only be adopted if it increases profit and consequently total surplus. (Of course, for there to be an increase in worker involvemt.
the prior level must have been rendered inappropriate by changing circumstances.)
Changes in worker involvement are therefore expected to be directly linked to changes total surplus.
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And for union regimes with local distributive bargaining:
(a) the level of worker involvement is unlikely to be chosen so 出 at total surplus is at or near a maXlrnum;
(b) any observed increase in worker involvernent need not be accornpanied by increases in total surplus, but will be associated with a decline in profitability. Again , however, we should look to a relationship between changes in variables.
Particularly in the nonunion case, because the choice of the amount of worker involvement is endogenous -and distributive bargaining is no 也reat (curve G(x) applies) -we do not expect a link between the level of 也is variable and the level of the joint surplus . Nonunion firms are managed so as to achieve near-maximum total surplus.
Whatever level of worker involvernent, be it high or low , that is necessary to achieve such performance will already have been chosen by management. Thus we expect no link between levels here. For unionized frrffis , on the other hand, the situation is more complicated because of the joint nature of con甘0 1. Too high a level of worker involvement would be revealed by a negative association between the level of worker involvement and the level of total surplus.
A comparison of levels can be expected to be informative where worker involvement is at least partly outside the con甘01 of the frrm , as in Germany. In the German case, works councils are mandatory but not automatic; 也ey have to be activated by the worker side . W orkers can be expected to choose a works council if it increases their share of the joint surplus. Where observed, therefore, works councils should be associated with lower profitability. As far as total surplus is concemed, an appropriately choseo mandate -where this is possible -should increase it.
In reality , a rnandate has to confront 也e problem of frrm heterogeneity. A diagram such as Figure 1 can be drawn for each firrn. There is 00 reason to expect the maximum of R(x) to correspond to the same level of worker involvement in each case. Most obviously , large firms are more likely to benefit from 也e structured worker iovolvement implied by a works council than their smal1er counterparts: x. wiII be higher for large than 5 small frrms . The implication 自由at although total surplus in large frrffis could be increased by a works council mandate, this is unlikely to obtain in small frrms.
Institutional Framework
We think of structured worker involvement as a continuum, ranging from information provision through consultation to participation/codetermination. The mechanisms whereby worker involvement is furthered , and the role of government, are of course quite di釘erent in the two countries. We begin our discussion wi出 the German case, often regarded as 也e exemplar of industrial democracy and hence located at 也c upper bound of the continuum.
In Germany, information, consultation, and participation are formal1y prescribed by law and enshrined in the apparatus of the Works Council (Betriebsrat). 1 This body shares some similarities with its British "counterp訂t'" 出e 'joint consultative committee, described below , even if the latter is nowhere near as authoritative.
Although the German works council is mandatory , it is not automatic. First there is a size threshold of five permanent employees, all of whom must be at least 18 years of age and three of whom must have at least six months' service. Second, a works council must be elected. 1ust three employees with voting rights (namely, 18-year olds and above), or a 甘ade union represented in the establishment, are needed to call for a works meeting to elect an electoral board, which is then responsible for holding the election.
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Once this procedure is activated, the works council is a fait accompli. The law fixes the size of 出e works council, which ranges from one to 惱的 -one members for establishments with up to 9,000 employees. For larger establishments, two additional members are added for each increment of 3,000 employees. 3 The expenses of the works council apparatus are bome by the employer, including release time for parttime councillors and the wages of full-time councillors. The number of the latter is a "nct ion of the employment size of the plant. 4 As we shall see, the influence of the works council also depends (in part) on plant size, so that it is not s甘ictly correct to refer to the German legislation as a one-size-fits-all mandate.
Tuming therefore to the rules goveming the information, consultation, and codetermination rights of works councils, the employer has frrst to provide the works council with both timely and "comprehensive" information to enable it to discharge its general duties and on 叩ecific matters relating to manpower planning and the introduction of new technology and production processes. Although union density is not a datum in wor}Q可 council regimes, we were unable to exploit this variation in our emp甘ical ana1ysis of the German data (see below).6
The British case is more briefly dealt with given the traditiona1 voluntaristic approach towards worker involvement. 7 The forms tak:en by worker involvement are 8 much less well-defined than in Germany and we have been guided in our measurements primari1y by the information available in the dataset, the W orkplace Industria1 Relations Survey (WIRS) , on which more below. We shall distinguish between formal and informal involvement, drawing on section L ("Consultation and Communìcation") of the survey questionnaire. Under the heading of formal methods of involvement, our main measure is obtained from question L1 , namely , whether the establishment has a joint manageremployee committee "primarily concerned wi也 consultation rather than negotiation" (and excluding committees dealing with single issues such as health and safety). We shall refer to "these bodies as "joint consultative committees" (JCCs). Under the informal heading, our measure relies on question L 19, namely, whether management uses regular roeetings to "communicate or consu1t with their employees". These regular mee位ngs include "quality circles," other problem-solving groups, and "briefing groups". The survey identifies other dimensions of communica位on and consultation, including the topics considered at the meetings, but these are not exploited in the present 仕eatment (but for fUI油er analysis, see Siebert and W缸， 1996).
JCCs are almost as prevalent in union as nonunion establishments, according to the WIRS data. Among establishments recognising unions, about 20 percent have JCCs in our sample; the corresponding figure for nonunion establishments is 18 percent. Regular meetings to communicate or consult -our informal measure -are somewhat more prevalent in union establishments (74 percent) than nonunion (61 percent).
As was argued in section 2, it is important to consider not only levels of but also changes in communication and consultation in the British case (where communication and consultation are endogenous to a greater extent than in Germany). U nfortunately , the WIRS considers only positive changes (that 尬， increases) , namely , "any change within the last 3 y側的 with the aim of increasing employee involvement in the operation of the enterprise" (question L23). Again we focus on JCCs and regular informal meetings .
Increases in JCCs include reorganization , or the setting up of a new committee, while mcreases 10 meetings include more meetings for the purposes of generaI consultation, on produc位on or productivity, and for discussionJ communication of 0由er topics including job appraisal.
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In this paper, therefore, measurement of worker involvement in British firms boils down to the machinery of a joint consultative council (JCC) and/or regular meetings to communicate or consult with employees. Both of these are zero-one dummies. They are used in level and change form. ln the German case, the measure of worker involvement is whether the frrm has a works council. For Britain, we also construct an index of worker involvement ( For the analysis of the British data, we emphasize the union-nonunion distinction.
This distinction is based upon whether establishments have a written agreement recognizing unions, either manual or nonmanual, for the purposes of negotiating pay and conditions of employment. Our samples are split almost equally between union and nonunion establishments.
The German data used in this inquiry were taken from the frrst wave (conducted in 1994) of a panel study investigating various aspects of frrm behavior and performance.
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The research proje仗， the Hannover Firm Panel, comprises four annual waves (see below).
The population covered encompasses al1 manufacturing establishments with at least five employees in the province of Lower Saxony. The sample of establishments is stratified according to firm size and industry , with oversampling of larger frrms. 8 As with the WIRS , mterviews were held with the owner or top manager of the establishment, often assisted by personnel management in the larger frrms. Some 1,025 establishments or 51 percent of all those approached agreed to take part in the frrst wave.
Despite the high attrition rate ，由e deviation between the acωal and planned s虹atification is relatively small.
The questionnaire used in the survey asks approximately 90 numbered questions.
The questions vary by wave. The frrst and the third waves focus squarely on labour market issues, whereas the second and fourth waves -which omit the works council question -focus rather more . on intemational issues. Themes addressed in the former waves include personnel s甘ucture and development, wages and salaries, working time, the determinants of employment, and frrm performance. Although. the item re中onse rate is relatively high for most questions in the survey , almost one-third of the sample (318 establishments) responded 也at they did not know the level of workplace union density. Furthermore, inspection of the data led us to question the accuracy of the positive responses (on which, see Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 1992b) . In the circumstances, we determined that it would be misleading to provide estimates of the association between union density and the outcome indicators. This is unfortunate because union density might usefully augment the dummy variable indicating 出e presence or otherwise of a works council in the outcome equations. That said, unliI the British case, the union-nonunion distinction does not motivate the German analysis which instead focuses on differences between small and large establishments.
It is important to note that, despite their mandatory natu凹， in weighted terms works councils occur in just 20. what it was 3 years ago?"). lO The dependent variable in the German wage equation 扭曲e wage and salary bil1 divided by the number of employees, similar to the British measure, also in levels, which is a weighted average calculated over separateskill categories. 11 The three-category relative profit measure is to all intents and purposes the same for the two countries (derived from the answer to the question "How would you assess the financial performance of this establishment compared with other establishments in the same indus甘y? "). Likewise, the employment change variable for Germany closely corresponds to 曲at for Britain, . each being calculated over a three ye訂 interval.
Our key independent variables are of course the participation measures. We earlier commented in some detail on the British measures of formal and informal worker involvement, as well as 也e construction of an index fashioned out of each. We also described our measures of the changes in worker involvement. By con甘ast the German measure is simpler and blunter: a single dummy variable signifying 由e presence or otherwise of a works council. The German dataset does not allow us to distinguish between possible "types" of works councils. Given that 曲e powers of the works council do vary formally (and likely in practice also) by establishment size (see section 3), however, we present results for the total sample and for a subsample of smaller establishments . employing between 21 個d 1 ∞ employees. The lower probability of observing works councils among such smaller firms provides additional grounds for this sample construction.
There are clearly many other factors that affect both levels of and changes in frrm performance and we need to con甘01 for these. At root, firm performance must be determined by management ability or good fortune. The variables included in our performance equations can bethought of as more or less adequately proxying these elusive quali位的. Performance will a1so be determined by cyclical factors , and by the degree of risk of the industry. or "s個te of the art" plant and equipment. In the British case, we are also able to include a union density variable which is relevant because it could cons甘ain experimentation. (Note, 也is variable is also relevant for nonunion establishments; even if they do oot recognize unions for collective bargaining purposes, they will still have union members.)
Thirdly , market dominance might signal managerial ability -as well as the possibility of monopoly rents. We control for market dominance in several ways: establishment size, whether the establishment is p紅t of a multi-plant firm, and whether the establishment has few competitors. Managers in smaller establishments might also have di前erent tastes -a desire for "independence" -which could translate into lower performance. 
Findings
Summary findings for Germany and Britain are presented in Table 1 . Full results for Britain are contained in Tables 2 through 5 , distinguishing between nonunion and union establishrnents. Detailed findings for Germany are given in Tables 6 也rough 9 ，出IS time distinguishing smaller establishments from the full sample . Broadly speaking, the British results for the index measure of information and consultation suggest that worker involvement tends to have positive effects in nonunion estab1ishments, but insignificant to negative e釘ects in the union group. For Germ組y ， any favorable impact of works councils 14 is confined to 也e full sample. We next consíder these results and their implications in more detail.
[ Table 1 near here]
Britain. Taking the British evidence frrst, consider the results for the labor productivity change measure, which we take to be closely related to the joint surplus. From the frrst two columns of Table 2 it can be seen that in the nonunion case changes in both formal and informal communication and consultation produce the anticipated positive coefficient estimates for bOth forma1 and informal communication, whether the variables are taken separately or as an ordered index.
[ Tables 2 and 3 near here]
Yet for the union establishments, For union establishments (the last two columns in Table 3 ) ，崗位e are opposing effects: increases in formal communication and consultation are associated with negative employment change' s~: while inéreases in the informal type seèm to be beneficial.
Nevertheless, the ordered index shows a significantly negative association.
[ Tables 4 and 5 near here] As for the level of finan仁ial performance, the commurtiéation and corisultation variables as well as the index -now all in levels -are generally insignificarit for the nonuniöri ' samplé. These results are reported in the frrst two cohl1nns öf Table 4 , and accord with ouf priors: management in nonunion frrms chooses levèls of wörker involvement, hígh or low, so as to achieve near-maximum performance. However, in the sample of union establishments, by con甘a哎， there are c1ear signs of a negative effect for the various measures of worker involvement (see the frrst two columns of Table 5 ). Most notab旬， the results for the ordered index indicate. a sharply negative effect.
Broadly speaking, the wage results are the other side of the fmancia1 performance coin. That is to say , worker involvement appears to raise wages in nonunion establishments but to have no discernible impact among their union counterparts. On the whole, these results are favorable to the view that, because the level of worker involvement is chosen to optimize performance in the nonunion establishment, there can be no association between 也at magnitude and the level of plant performance. However, in union establishments too much worker involvement could well be chøsen.
Space cons甘aints prevent much discussion of the coe旺icients for the con甘01 variables. Focusing therefore on the productivi句 growth equation, we note 由at 也is measure of performance is higher for older establishments, within establishments operating a payment-by-resul~電 scheme and/or a profit-sharing scheme, and among establishments with lower union density. These results tend to obtain across union and nonunion regim{ alike.
These British results are likely to be compared with those of Femie and Metcalf involvement. This enables us focus on a given establishment' s decisions through time, rather than comparing different establishments (which we see as essentially noncomparable in the British case, at least in nonunion establishments, given the endogenous nature of the worker involvement). We also emphasize the different decision processes in nonunion and union establishments, and the zone of indeterminacy that surrounds decisions 00 worker involvement in the latter.
Germa份﹒ The German results are presented in Tables 6 through 9 it remains true that the powers of the works council exceed those of a British JCC.
[ Table 6 near here]
We next discuss the productivity , employment change, profitability , and wage results in tum . Beginning with value-added per worker, the most notable result from [ Tables 7 and 8 near here] The employment e釘'ects of German works councils, charted in Table 7 , do not offer any evidence of classic insider behavior. The association between works council presence and employment change 1991-94 is negative, but the coefficient estimate is poorly determined. The German results are more complicated. Large establishments with works councils ap恨ar to have higher productivity. The problem here is the presence of consistently higher earnings in works counciI regimes and the absence of any productivity effect in the small establishment sample. Consistently higher eamings across the" spectrutn of works council establishments points to rent seeking behavior, even if this phenòmenon does not seem to be accompanied by slower employment growth. In larger establishments with works councils, the issue is whether higher productivity offsev可 the profit effect (anticipated by the model) to yield higher total surplus. With the data at our disposal we cannot answer this question definitively.
For small establishments wi出 works councils, we can rule out any increase ín . 1Olnt
surplus because of the combination of lower profitability and no increase in the valueadded productivity measure. Smaller establishments might therefore be well advised to consider whether there are practical altematives to works councils, that is, measures 也a1
reduce the demand for such representation among the workforce. We are currently far from being able to iden位有， such factors with any precision.
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It follows 也at in both the cases of large and small establishments further progres~ in analyzing the impact of works councils On efficiency requires additional data to enable the researcher to get ~ bettet: h~Qle on total surplus. Even armed withsuch information, the story does not end here because of possible works council effects on frrm investments in tangible and intangible capital. That is to say , even if output is unch. anged in the cross section, the effect of rent seeking on investment -via a capture of the quasirents to long-lived, relation-specific capital -may serve to lower efficiency (Hirsch , 1991 2. The union has only to claim that it has at least one member in the plant; no formal regls甘ation procedure is required, and the identity of the union member does not have to be disclosed.
3. The legislation also automatically provides for "cen甘al works councils" in companies with more 由an one plant and for the election of "combine councils" in groups of companIes.
4. For example, in establishments with between 300 and 600 employees, one (of the 9) works council1ors is released 台om any work duti郎， whereas in plants with, say , 9 ，∞ 1-10 ，∞o employees eleven (of the 31) councillors are full time.
5.
It should also be noted that the works council is explicitly held to a "peace obligation"
and cannot therefore withdraw labor. 9. English 甘anslations of the first and second wave survey questionnaires are contained in Brand et al . (1996) . We note parenthetically that because of negligible changes in works council statuS between the frrst and second waves, we were unable to exploit the panel character of the data.
10. Where the dependent variable is categorical rather than continuous we use the ordered probit estimator (Madda尬， 1983).
11. Median establishment weekly pay data are available from the WIRS for three manual occupational categories. From these median values, we calculate a manual worker pay average for individual establishments using the employment proportions as weights.
12. It has been argued in the German case that profit sharing for workers is an altemative form of worker "participation" available to more efficient managers, enabling them to sidestep the paraphernalia and delayed decisionmaking of a council. Al鉤， profit sharing for managers has been identified wi也 a more consensual management approach seeking compromise, and thereby lesseoing the need for workers to elect works councils 00 defensive grounds. On these arguments, see Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner (l 997b).
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. We also experimeoted with a subsample of flfms employing 10-249 workers. The main findings with respect to works council impact were unaffected. Full results are available from the authors upon request.
14. In the German dataset we also have access to an absolute profit measure, again based on a self-reported, five-element categorical measure. Grouping these categories in similar fashion as for the relative (to other flfms) profit measure and rerunning the equation in Table 8 strongly confrrmed the negative association between works council presence and profitability. (See also Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 1997a.) 15 . Although we have elsewhere reported that teamwork is associated with a lower probability of observing a works council, which might hint at the presence of real alternatives (see Addison , Schnabel, and W agner, 1997b).
16. More negative evidence, on the basis of actual investments in physical capital, albeit for a much smaller sample, is reported in Addison, Kraft, and Wagner (1993). Notes: The table gives the sign of the coefficient estimate on the works council dummy for Gennany and 00 the index measure of infonnation and joint consultatìon (levels or changes) for Britain. The tìgures in parentheses denote significance levels. Union establishments in Britain are defined as those with a written agreement recognizing either manual or nonmanual uruOIl5 for negotiating pay and conditions of empIoyment; nonunion establishments, as defined, do not necessarily record zero union density Source: Tables 2.9 Table2: Britain . see Table 6 for definition of other variables a Profitability is an index measure derived on the basis of the manager' s assessment of performance relative to other firms in the same industry See Table 6 for definition of other variables Lingnan College Library Al1 books on loan are subject to recal1 after 2 weeks Date Due 到期單
